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Abstract 
This paper explores the utility of using principal-agent analysis  – both at the level of the 
Commission and the European Union as a whole – to explain the EU agenda-setting process in 
the negotiations between the EU and South Africa that led to the Trade, Development and Co-
operation Agreement of 1999. The  paper argues that the internal Commission negotiations, 
which are often overlooked in analyses of EU trade negotiations, need to be  analysed. It 
demonstrates that both the initial EU agenda and the final agreement with South Africa were 
influenced by the intra-Commission negotiations, and that the EU negotiators, who had strong 
developmental interests due to their location within DG Development, were particularly 
influential. 
 
Introduction 
Because of its complex internal structure, the EU is often seen as a rigid trade negotiator, who 
presents its negotiating opponent with a ‘take it or leave it’ position (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 
p. 79). The most common approach when explaining this rigid EU position is to use principal-
agent analysis (e.g. Meunier 2000; Nicolaïdis 1999; Pollack 2003; Woolcock 2005) to 
demonstrate how the preferences of the EU Member States  (the principals) have been 
combined through complex and often lengthy processes into a joint EU position, or a ‘single 
voice’ (e.g. Meunier 2005), represented by the Commission (the agent), which has been 
delegated the power to represent the EU and to conclude trade agreements with third parties. 
 
The main focus in these analyses is the extent to which the Member State principals are able to 
control the negotiating Commission agent during the course of negotiations with a third party, 
and the extent to which the Commission is able to act autonomously, to stretch its delegated 
powers,  and push through its own preferences and thereby escape controls sought by t he 
Member States (e.g. Bilal 1998; Kerremans 2004; Meunier 2000; Meunier and Nicolaïdis 1999; 
Pollack 2003; Woolcock 2005). The Commission is thus treated as a rational, unitary, actor with 
fixed preferences, generally in favour of further integration and liberalisation. While recognising   3 
that  the Commission cannot be a unitary actor in reality, these  studies argue that the 
Commission acts with enough unity vis-à-vis the third party that it is appropriate to treat it as 
such. Since international trade negotiations are regulated by the EU’s Common Commercial 
Policy, which is one of the oldest and most integrated Community policies, the Commission has 
come to play a key role as the agenda-setter and EU negotiator vis-à-vis third parties in this 
policy area. This position  has allowed the Commission  to accumulate extensive  political and 
policy-making experience and expertise, and considerable political influence. 
 
If, however, the focus shifts to the internal workings of the Commission, a second principal-agent 
relationship may be detected – inside the Commission between the Directorate-Generals (DGs) 
and the Commission negotiating team, who in turn are seen as rational, unitary, actors with fixed 
preferences.  Thus two principal-agent relationships  may be hypothesised when  the EU is 
negotiating with a third party; one at the level of the Commission and the other at the level of the 
EU as a whole, even though, the agent is in fact the same in both relationships. The analytical 
framework presents a situation in which there is one agent (the Commission negotiating team) 
and two sets of principals (the DGs in the Commission and the Member States in the Council).  
 
Although principal-agent analyses have been used in different ways, most  make  four basic 
assumptions:   
 
(1) The principals delegate power to an agent to act on their behalf. 
(2) The r elationship between the principals and the agent is characterised by conflicting 
preferences and information asymmetry. 
(3) The principals are able to control the behaviour of the agent through various control 
mechanisms. 
(4) The principal control is incomplete which may cause the agent to act upon its own 
preferences rather than those of its principals.  
 
This paper tests these four assumptions in the context of the EU’s trade negotiations with South 
Africa, which led to the Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA) in 1999. The   4 
central argument of the paper is that the Commission did not act as a unitary actor in the TDCA 
negotiations; crucial to understanding the EU’s position in these negotiations was the 
relationships between the DGs and the Commission negotiating team. In other words, EU 
agenda-setting process
1 in this case is better conceptualised as involving two principals and one 
agent. 
 
Delegation 
Commission Level: Normally when the EU initiates negotiations with third parties, a temporary 
task  force is set up within the Commission with overall responsibility for the negotiations, 
including the tasks of coordinating the interests of the different DGs into a Commission proposal, 
representing the Commission vis-à-vis the Council, and representing the EU in its negotiations 
with the third parties. Thus, following South Africa’s formal acceptance in November 1994 of the 
EU invitation to work towards a comprehensive long-term relationship (European Commission: 
SEC (95) 486),  the Commission appointed  a  negotiating team in DG Development with the 
overall responsibility for the EU-South Africa negotiations. The Commission negotiating team 
consisted of the EU chief negotiator, i.e. the Director-General for Development, the 
Commissioner for Development, and the so called Task Force South Africa (TFSA), which was 
made up of four officials from DG Development. The Director-General for Development 
interacted with the other Director-Generals within the Commission, COREPER in the Council, 
and the South African chief negotiator, i.e. the Ambassador to the EU. The Commissioner for 
Development interacted with the College of Commissioners, the General Affairs Council and his 
South African counterpart, the Minister for Trade and Industry. However, both the Director-
General and the Commissioner for Development were fully supported by TFSA, which was 
responsible for the actual running of the negotiations, and interacted with the Commission official 
from the other DGs, the Working Groups and the Committees in the Council, and the South 
African negotiating team, which was based within the Department for Trade and Industry. It was 
the four members of the task force that prepared all the briefing notes, and they were present at 
all negotiating rounds. In fact, in many of the interviews carried out with Commission officials 
involved in the negotiations, the members of the task force were referred to as the chief   5 
negotiators (Interviews, Commission officials, DG Development and DG Trade, May-June 2004). 
Consequently, the ‘Commission negotiating team’ and ‘TFSA’ are used alternately in this paper. 
 
During this time of delegation it was the geographic position of the third party with which the EU 
was about to negotiate an agreement that decided within which DG the responsible task force 
should be established. In 1995 the responsibility for South Africa had recently moved from DG 
Trade to DG Development during the overall re-structuring of the Commission, and consequently 
TFSA was set up in DG Development (Interview, Commission official, DG Development, May 
2004). 
 
By delegating the task of agenda-setting, the DG principals expected the task force to come up 
with the initial proposal around which they could then express their preferences. Although TFSA 
was based within DG Development, it was supposed to act as a neutral entity, representing the 
Commission as a whole, and preparing a balanced proposal to the Council, incorporating the 
different interests of the DGs.  
 
The reason for delegating the task of representing the  DGs during the  negotiations  with the 
Member States in the Council and the negotiations with South Africa was to ensure that any 
Commission position taken in either negotiation would be acceptable to all DGs. Because, 
although a negotiating task force has to act within the mandate adopted by the Commission (and 
later the Council) as a whole, there are constantly new issues appearing during the process of 
an international trade negotiation, around which common stand points have to be taken within 
the Commission.  
 
EU Level: The Member States granted the European Community exclusive competence in the 
area of trade in the Treaty of Rome in 1957. Through this delegation of trade policy the Member 
States are represented by the Community in international trade negotiations with third parties, 
and consequently speaks with a ‘single voice’ (e.g.  Meunier 2005). The Common Commercial 
Policy is an area of exclusive competence, which means that the Member States cannot act 
individually in this area and enter into separate international agreements with third parties, which   6 
would affect the Community policy (Macleod, Henry and Hyett 1996: p. 61).  In addition to the 
delegation of trade policy to the Community, there is a second level of delegation in which the 
Council delegates the agenda-setting and the negotiating power in third party negotiations to the 
Commission (Meunier 2005: p. 22).  Thus,  in the TDCA negotiations,  as in other trade 
negotiations, the Member State principals in the Council delegated the power to the Commission 
agent to represent the EU and lead the negotiations with South Africa.  
 
Consequently, the  assumption about delegation c ould be  seen both at the level of the 
Commission and  the EU as a whole. The TFSA agent was delegated the power to set the 
agenda and lead the negotiations with South Africa by both the DG and Member State 
principals.  
 
Conflicting Preferences and Information Asymmetry  
Commission Level:  Although TFSA had been delegated the task of setting the agenda for the 
EU-South Africa negotiations by coordinating the interests of the affected DGs from a neutral 
position, it did have its own preferences, different from those of its principals. The main dividing 
lines within the Commission were between TFSA, DG Trade, DG Enterprise and DG Agriculture. 
In line with the assumption that the preferences of the DGs depend on the sector or function 
they represent (e.g. Peters 1992: p. 115-6; Egeberg 2002: p. 8), TFSA’s own preferences were 
development oriented, given its location within DG Development. Ideally the members of TFSA 
would have wanted to offer South Africa full membership of the Lomé Convention
2 as that would 
bring in a strong actor into the ACP family and thus strengthen Lomé which was the core area of 
responsibility of DG Development. In wanting to play a strong developmental role, it was in DG 
Development’s interest to support South Africa (Interviews, Commission officials, DG 
Development, April-May 2004).  
 
DG Trade is usually seen as adopting a liberal approach and favouring free trade (e.g. 
Bretherton and Vogler 1999: p. 51). In line with these preferences it wanted to establish a   7 
bilateral agreement with South Africa leading to a Free Trade Area within the framework of the 
newly established WTO.  It wanted the bilateral agreement to be based on the new Article XXIV 
of GATT, which establishes that a free trade agreement should “…eliminate duties and other 
restrictive regulations of commerce…on substantially all trade between the constituent territories 
in products originating in such territories”. Although DG Trade realised that the difference in size 
of the respective economies needed to be taken into account, it was very clear on its 
commitment to  reciprocal trade liberalisation. It stressed the need for the EU to adopt an 
offensive attitude in certain a reas, such as textiles and clothing products, and push for a 
reciprocal and symmetrical liberalisation in the context of a Free Trade Area ( Interview, 
Commission official, DG Development, June 2004).  
 
DG Enterprise’s main interest was for South Africa to open up its industrial market in areas such 
as automotives, chemicals, wood and paper, precious metals, glass, transport equipment, and 
electrical equipment, as well as protecting certain sectors of the EU industry from competition, 
for example textiles, aluminium and ferroalloys (Interview, Commission official, DG Enterprise, 
October 2005). 
 
DG Agriculture wanted to protect the agricultural production of the EU from South African 
competition. While DG Agriculture did regard South Africa’s relatively small  agricultural 
production as a potential threat to EU products, its main reason to take a protectionist approach 
in these negotiations was the fact that the agreement between the EU and South Africa was 
seen to be setting a precedent for subsequent negotiations with third parties. Being negotiated in 
accordance with the rules of the new WTO and Article XXIV of GATT, DG Agriculture was 
worried that the agreement would be a model for future agreements with other third countries 
with more competitive agricultural sectors (Interview, Commission official, DG Trade, June 
2004).  
 
The informational advantage which principal-agent analysis often ascribes to the agent was also 
seen, to a certain degree, in the relationship between the TFSA agent and the DG principals. 
Regarding the developmental dimensions of the negotiations, in particular South Africa’s   8 
potential membership of the Lomé Convention, TFSA possessed the technical expertise given 
that responsibility for the ACP countries has always been with DG Development. However, for 
the other technical aspects of the trade negotiations, TFSA had to rely on the expertise within 
the different DGs, in particular DG Trade, DG Enterprise and DG Agriculture. Consequently, it is 
not possible to attribute technical expertise as one of the reasons for the TFSA agent’s 
informational advantage vis-à-vis its DG principals. However, it did  obtain an informational 
advantage through its coordinating role. Certain DGs had a deeper and more detailed level of 
technical expertise than TFSA, but the task force had the overall picture of the negotiations and 
the interests of the different DGs (Interview, Commission official, DG Development, April 2004).  
 
EU Level:  In the Council the Commission negotiating team faced some Member States, 
including Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK, that were supportive of its 
developmental approach and favoured greater liberalisation and an opening of the EU market for 
South African products, and others, including France, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece, who 
favoured a more protectionist approach (European Parliament 1997: 223.242). This, which is in 
line with a general pattern of EU trade policy (e.g. Woolcock 2005, p. 390), was particularly the 
case in the agricultural field given that the South African agricultural production, with its focus on 
citrus fruits and wines, in many respects corresponds to that of the Southern European Member 
States. However, whenever the negotiations focused on products produced in the northern 
Member States, such as beef, milk powder, and cut flowers, protectionist tendencies were very 
clear in these states as well (Interview, Commission official, DG Development, April 2004).  
 
The informational advantage  of the agent is often  seen in the relationship between  the 
Commission and the Council in third party trade negotiations (e.g. Nugent 1997; Hooghe and 
Marks 2001; Pollack 2003). Given its technical expertise and extensive experience in the area of 
Common Commercial Policy since 1957, the Commission has an informational advantage over 
the Council. In addition, while the Commission has fewer financial and human resources than 
the Member States, it is placed “…at the centre of a wide-ranging network including national 
governments, subnational governments, and interest groups [which] gives it a unique 
informational base for independent influence on policy making” (Hooghe and Marks 2001: p. 11).   9 
In the EU-South Africa negotiations this informational advantage of the Commission was seen 
and  further intensified by the l ong history of Community relations with South Africa. The 
Community had initiated its policies towards South Africa in 1977, and although the role of the 
Commission was limited in the beginning, it came to play a leading role once the first moves 
towards a democratic transition were made in early 1990. In addition, once the negotiations had 
started, the informational disadvantage of the Member States grew even further as they were not 
present during the actual negotiations with South Africa, and had to rely on the information 
conveyed to them by the Commission.  
 
This demonstrates how the assumption about diverging preferences and information asymmetry 
characterised the principal-agent relationship both at the level of the Commission and the EU as 
a whole. The diverging preferences were clearer between the TFSA agent and the individual DG 
principals, than between the task force and the individual Member State principals given that the 
national positions changed depending on the sector being discussed, and at times the task force 
had great support from some of the Member States. The informational advantage of the agent 
vis-à-vis the principals was however greater in the relationship between TFSA and the Member 
States in the Council, than between the task force and the DGs, as the latter often had to 
provide their TFSA agent with the technical expertise of their respective policy areas.  
 
 
Principal Control Mechanisms 
The assumption about the principals’ ability to control the TFSA agent is tested during the two 
stages of mandates and negotiations. These two stages, together with that of ratification, are 
often used when looking at the decision-making processes in trade negotiations between the EU 
and a third party (e.g. Holland 2002; Meunier 2005), to highlight the respective roles played by 
the Council and the Commission at each stage. Although ratification is one of the main ways in 
which principals are able to exercise control over the negotiating agent, as the agent knows that 
any agreement it reaches has to be ratified by the principals (e.g. Meunier and Nicolaïdis 1999; 
Putnam 1988), it is not included here as it normally is a matter of just ‘voting up or down’ 
(Putnam 1988: p. 437), and does not expose any tensions in the relationship between the   10 
principals and the agent. The TDCA agreement was indeed agreed and ratified by both the 
Commission and the Council.
3 
 
Mandates  
Commission Level: The initial proposal for the first negotiating mandate was prepared by TFSA 
as soon as it was appointed in January 1995. However, the structure of the negotiations, i.e. the 
decision to negotiate a Free Trade Agreement, had to a great extent already been determined 
by DG Trade, which was responsible for South Africa before 1995. Once it became clear that the 
apartheid regime would come to an end in early 1990, DG Trade engaged in a number of 
exploratory missions to South Africa. The preference of DG Trade for a Free Trade Agreement 
was clearly explained to the South Africans, and there was little scope to change this stance 
(Interview, Commission official, DG Development, May 2004). This way, DG Trade was able to 
exercise great control over the task force during this initial agenda-setting phase when the 
proposal for the first mandate was developed. The task force had to stay  within the overall 
structure proposed by DG Trade, but could develop the developmental aspect of the mandate 
proposal. In particular, it pushed for making South Africa a  qualified member of the Lomé 
Convention. The participation of DG Enterprise and DG Agriculture was very limited at this initial 
agenda-setting stage.  
 
The first proposal for a negotiating mandate to be presented to the Council thus represented a 
compromise mainly between DG Trade and DG Development. It proposed a twin-track approach 
aimed at, on the one hand, making South Africa a qualified member of the Lomé Convention, 
allowing it to fully participate in the political institutions of the Convention and to benefit from a 
limited number of financial provisions, and on the other, establishing a bilateral agreement with 
provisions for a future Free Trade Area between the EU and South Africa (European 
Commission: SEC (95) 486).  
 
While it was relatively easy for the TFSA agent to get its proposal for the first mandate approved 
by the DGs, the second mandate proved more difficult. At this point DG Agriculture and DG 
Enterprise became seriously involved in the negotiations. Given the overall aim of ensuring that   11 
the agreement would be in line with Article XXIV of GATT, i.e. that the coverage of the Free 
Trade Area should be at least 90%
4 of all trade between the parties after a transitional period of 
a maximum of 10 years, DG Agriculture pushed for a percentage as low as possible – around 
50% – of South African agricultural products to enter the EU market duty free. It also wanted to 
completely exclude a number of sensitive agricultural products, such as certain fresh fruits and 
vegetables, from the Free Trade Area, as it knew that the offer made to South Africa could also 
be offered to others, such as Chile and Mexico, and was consequently unwilling to set a 
precedent of an ‘extensive’ opening of the EU agricultural market. On the other hand, DG 
Agriculture expected South Africa to open up its agricultural market to EU products at a level 
higher than 90%, as South Africa’s sensitivities were in the non-agricultural, rather than the 
agricultural, sector (Interview, Commission official, DG Trade, June 2004). 
 
Given DG Agriculture’s wish to open up the EU market as little as possible in the area of 
Agricultural products, DG Enterprise knew that the EU market would have to be open up at 
almost 100% in the area of non-agricultural products, in order to meet the WTO requirement of 
90% trade liberalisation overall. Its main emphasis was rather on making South Africa open up 
its industrial market. 
 
Following three months of intra-Commission consultations, TFSA presented a proposal for the 
complementary negotiating directives, which was adopted by the Commission in October 1995. 
The proposal outlined the objective of the Free Trade Area, stating that it should “be gradually 
established, over a reasonable period of time, covering substantially all trade, without excluding 
any specific sector”. It further specified that at least 97% of all non-agricultural imports, and at 
least 55% of all agricultural imports from South Africa should enter the EU market duty free 
(European Commission: SEC (95) 1748). The low figure of 55% reflected the protectionist 
interest of DG Agriculture.  
 
EU Level:  In the Council there was general agreement among the Member states about the 
need to support South Africa’s democratic transition, and the Commission proposal for the first 
mandate was adopted without any major changes by the General Affairs Council in June 1995.   12 
However, the Member State principals became more engaged in the discussions around the 
second mandate outlining the trade aspects of the agreement. They had strong views about the 
future trade agreement to be negotiated with South Africa, and were consequently keen to 
ensure that the mandate would steer the task force to act in accordance with their interests.  The 
Member States expressed their general support for the strengthening of trade relations with 
South Africa, but underlined the need for caution when discussing the complementary directives, 
as the negotiations with South Africa would set a precedent for future agreements (Council of 
the EU: 12116/95).  
 
The main issue which caused debate within the Council was the coverage and exclusions of the 
Free Trade Area. Regarding the suggested figure of 55% of South African agricultural products 
to enter the EU duty free, Sweden and the Netherlands thought 55% was too low, while Spain 
considered it to be excessive (Council of the EU 12116/95). Others, such as Finland, France and 
the UK, argued against sticking to specific percentage figures at this stage, and in response to 
these latter  Member States it was agreed that the percentages in the Commission proposal 
should only serve as reference points and not be “…interpreted as c riteria for defining the 
concept of an FTA” (Council of the EU: 5310/96). This meant that the Member States did not, 
through the mandate, restrict the task force further in this area than the Commission DGs had 
already done. However, given the diverging interests between the Member States, with mainly 
the Mediterranean countries being reluctant to open up the EU market,  and the Northern 
Member States favouring greater liberalisation than that suggested in the Commission proposal, 
it was clear that the decision not to specify specific figures of liberalisation did not offer the task 
force greater autonomy in its negotiations with South Africa. Instead, the decision not to specify 
the degree of liberalisation at this stage, just meant that intense negotiations within the Council 
around this issue would continue in parallel with the negotiations between the EU and South 
Africa.  
 
A clear indication of the reluctance on the part of the Mediterranean Member States, including 
France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, to open up the EU market, was their suggestion of a 
so called exclusion list, identifying sensitive products to be excluded from the agreement. TFSA,   13 
which had resisted DG Agriculture’s demand for specific products to be excluded for the 
agreement, highlighted the importance of engaging in an open negotiation with South Africa, in 
which details about specific products would be determined as the negotiations proceeded. 
However, the insistence by the Mediterranean countries was such that the TFSA in the end had 
to agree to an exclusion list involving 39% of South Africa’s agricultural exports to the EU 
(European Parliament 1997: 223.242).   
 
Negotiations 
Commission Level:  The negotiating directives – once adopted by  the  Council – provided the 
broad guidelines for TFSA. However, the actual details of the trade agreement had to be worked 
out by the task force and the South African negotiation team during the course of the 
international negotiations. In order for the task force to seek advice from the different DGs about 
the details and new issues appearing during the negotiations with South Africa, GINAS (Group 
Inter Service pour les Négociations avec l’Afrique du Sud) was set up. It consisted of all the DGs 
affected by the negotiations with South Africa, and given the extensive scope of the agreement, 
most of the Commission DGs eventually became part of this group. Through this inter-service 
group the DG principals were able to monitor the performance of their task force agent. It met on 
a monthly basis with TFSA to review progress of the negotiations, and to offer their advice or 
objections.  
 
In addition to GINAS, the core group, consisting of those DGs most closely involved in the 
negotiations (DG Trade, DG Enterprise and DG Agriculture), met more frequently to ensure that 
their interests were taken into account by TFSA, and to assist the task force in formulating a 
Commission position. Their representatives were always present during the actual negotiation 
rounds with South Africa, and they also led the more technical aspects of their respective parts 
of the negotiations with South Africa. This presence of the core group during the negotiations 
with South Africa, allowed the DG principals to closely monitor the actions of TFSA, as well as 
controlling the outcome of the negotiated agreement by handling parts of the negotiations 
themselves.  
   14 
EU Level: The most common way in which the Member States in the Council are able to control 
the Commission during a trade negotiation is through the 133 Committee, which consists of 
senior trade officials from the Member States. The 133 Committee maintains a regular dialogue 
with the Commission to ensure that it does not act outside of the mandate, and to agree on 
negotiating positions as new issues emerge in the international negotiation (Woolcock 2000: p. 
382).  The 133 Committee played an important role in the EU-South Africa negotiations. The 
task force briefed the Committee on a regular basis about the developments of the negotiations, 
and consulted with it about responses to issues raised by South Africa. However, the bulk of the 
discussions between the Commission and the Council took place in the Southern Africa Working 
Group (Council of the EU: 5310/96). The Working Group offered a way for the Member States to 
closely monitor and control the behaviour of the task force, as it met more frequently than the 
133 Committee.  
 
An example of an issue that played a significant role in the Southern Africa Working Group and 
the 133 Committee, as well as in COREPER and the General Affairs Council, was the protection 
of geographical denominations. In 1998 Spain and Portugal made a demand in the Southern 
Africa Working Group that South Africa stopped the usage of the terms ‘Port’ and ‘Sherry’ for its 
fortified wines. They argued that the terms were geographical indications of Jerez in Spain and 
Oporto in Portugal. South Africa, wanting to protect its production of Port and Sherry, disputed 
that these terms should be offered protection, and argued that they have become common to the 
English language, and thus were not necessarily associated with the regions of Jerez and 
Oporto (Links 1998). Although the task force understood these concerns of South Africa, it could 
not resist the pressure from the Member States to protect Port and Sherry as geographical 
indications.  Spain and Portugal were supported by France, Greece and Italy on this issue. 
Although the other Member States did not have strong interests in protecting certain wines or 
spirits as geographical indications, there was no resistance to these demands made by Spain 
and Portugal. As one Commission official highlighted, there is a general agreement between the 
Member States within the Council to respect each other’s sensitivities in international trade 
negotiations, given that these sensitivities change depending on the strengths of the third party. 
Consequently, although a majority of the Member States were unaffected by the Port and Sherry   15 
issue, they did not object to Spain’s and Portugal’s demands given that they knew that in the 
future their sensitive products may be under discussion, and then they would not want to be met 
by resistance from the other Member States (Interview, Commission official, DG Competition, 
October 2005). 
 
The Southern Africa Working Group and the 133 Committee thus worked as control mechanisms 
for the Member State principals. The Member States were able to raise new issues in these fora 
and ensure that TFSA acted upon their instructions vis-à-vis South Africa.  
 
This section demonstrates how the assumption about principal control was seen both at the level 
of the Commission and the EU as a whole. The two mandates provided ways for the DGs and 
the Member States to control and set the parameters for the TFSA agent in its negotiations with 
South Africa in order to ensure that their functional and national interests respectively  were 
represented. It is also clear that it was in the intra-Commission negotiations that most of the 
structure and content of the mandates were developed, and the Member State principals then 
responded to these proposals and sometimes further restricted the autonomy given to TFSA by 
the DG principals.  During the negotiations with South Africa the TFSA agent then continued to 
be monitored by the DG principals, through GINAS and the core  group, and by the Member 
State principals, through the Southern Africa Working Group and the 133 Committee. Here the 
ability of the DGs to control the task force was greater than that of the Member States as the 
DGs of the core group were present, and participated, in the negotiation rounds with South 
Africa. This is different from most principal-agent relationships, in which the principals are not 
able to directly observe the agent’s actions (Arrow 1985). 
 
Agent Autonomy 
Despite this ability of the two sets of principals to control and monitor the TFSA agent, the task 
force was, in line with the principal-agent  assumption that the control mechanisms of the 
principals are incomplete, at certain times able to pursue its own interests, rather than those of 
its principals. This section explores this ability of TFSA to act autonomously during the same 
stages as those used above, i.e. mandates and negotiation.    16 
 
Mandates 
Commission Level:  The mandate proposals offered a way for the DG principals to set the 
parameters for the behaviour of TFSA in the negotiations with South Africa. However, it was the 
responsibility of the task force to come up with the initial proposal for the mandate around which 
the DG principals then expressed their views. This gave the task force a considerable amount of 
autonomy to develop the mandate proposal according to its own interests, and given its location 
within DG Development, TFSA was able to ensure that its developmental interests were 
included in the mandate proposals. As argued by Holland (1995: p. 88), the DG that controls the 
South Africa question has a great impact on how it is defined, and how it is pushed through in 
the policy making process. Consequently the agenda-setting right of TFSA offered it a 
considerable amount of autonomy to push its own interests.   
 
The way in which TFSA put together the initial proposal for the first mandate, and managed to 
get it adopted by the Commission, highlights three ways in which the task force used its 
autonomy and obtained an advantage vis-à-vis its DG principals. First, the fact that the trade 
aspect of the negotiations, which was expected to cause more tensions and debates both within 
the Commission and the Council, was left to be worked out in an additional mandate, ensured 
that the TFSA could get its key development issues adopted relatively quickly by the DG 
principals. The proposal for the first mandate mainly represented the developmental interests of 
TFSA and South Africa, and although these issues were relatively uncontroversial given the 
general agreement among all DGs about the need to support South Africa following its transition 
to a democratic society, it meant that TFSA managed to obtain approval for these issues by its 
DG principals prior to the negotiations about the more c ontroversial trade issues, and 
consequently ensured that these development issues would not be used as trade-offs against 
certain trade interests strongly advocated by the DGs.   
 
Second, by preparing the proposal for the first mandate quickly, with the argument that it wanted 
to show its commitment to South Africa, TFSA offered its DG principals little time to debate the 
issue, which limited their engagement in the agenda-setting process. In addition, by preparing   17 
the proposal quickly it limited the number of DGs that would express their view on the 
agreement. In line with the hypothesis that the involvement of principals, or domestic 
constituencies, increase over time (e.g. Evans 1993: p. 404), it was possible to detect 
progressively increased mobilisation among the DG principals, which increased the difficulty of 
coordinating the different interests for TFSA. At the time when the proposal for the first mandate 
was adopted by the Commission in March 1995, 13 out of the total 26 DGs were identified as 
‘associated’ to the proposal, which meant that in addition to DG Development, which was the 
primary responsible for the proposal, they were part of the intra-Commission negotiations 
(European Commission: SEC (1995) 486). At the time of the conclusion of the agreement in 
1999, this number of associated DGs had increased to 23 (European Commission: COM (1999) 
245). Thus, by acting quickly TFSA limited the number of potential objections to its proposal.  
 
Third, by proposing the use of the twin-track approach  of making South Africa a qualified 
member of the Lomé Convention on the one hand, and negotiating a bilateral trade agreement 
on the other, TFSA embarked on a new format of third party negotiations. Given the requirement 
for the two sets of negotiations to proceed in parallel, the task force ensured that a vast number 
of issues would be discussed, and thus that there would be significant opportunities for issue 
linkages. In addition, the new approach offered the task force a lead in suggesting how it would 
be carried out. I n a way, they were setting the agenda for the  structure  of the negotiations, 
which, in line with Peters (2001: p. 82) agenda-setting argument that whoever controls the initial 
definition of the agenda is likely to be successful throughout the policy-making process, offered 
TFSA a great amount of autonomy.  
 
Consequently, the task force was able to exercise a significant amount of autonomy and push 
through its own developmental preferences during the preparation of the first mandate proposal. 
Its autonomy did however decrease during the development of the second mandate. At this 
stage the TFSA agenda was, as demonstrated above, compromised by the more protectionist 
and less developmental demands made by DG Agriculture and DG Enterprise.   
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EU Level:   Although it is the Council that provides the Commission with the mandate, the 
Council responds to a proposal presented to it by the Commission. In general, the final proposal 
adopted by the Council contains at least 80% of the original Commission draft (Hull 1993: p. 83). 
 
As demonstrated above, TFSA’s proposal for the first mandate was mainly a combination of the 
preferences of DG Development and DG Trade. Given the relative indifference among the 
Member States regarding South Africa’s Lomé membership, the task force had no problem in 
pushing through its two-track proposal of making South Africa a qualified member of the Lomé 
Convention and establishing a bilateral trade agreement between the two parties. There were, 
however, a few areas where the Member States in the Council tried to push through their own 
preferences. One example was how Germany, supported by Austria, Belgium and Denmark, 
made a request to include a ‘readmission clause’ that would commit South Africa to take full 
responsibility for its ‘illegal immigrants’ to the EU (Interview, Commission official,  DG 
Development, April 2004). However, although there was a joint declaration in the final TDCA 
emphasising ‘the importance of co-operating together for the prevention and control of illegal 
immigration’, the task force successfully managed to postpone the decision around this issue to 
the very end of the negotiations with South Africa, so that it would not form part of the 
negotiating  mandates, and thus, given the Member States’ competence in  the area of 
immigration, prevent a situation in which it would have had to involve the Member States in the 
negotiations with South Africa (ibid.). Even if it was clear that the final Agreement would be 
defined as a  ‘mixed agreement’,  TFSA managed to obtain a mandate which foresaw a 
Community agreement, which then allowed the task force to lead the negotiations as if it were a 
Community agreement rather than a mixed one, and thus restricted the involvement of the 
Member States.    
 
While the first mandate was characterised by flexibility and a great amount of autonomy for the 
Commission negotiators, the second mandate was much more rigid. The Council discussions 
around this mandate went on for almost five months because of the difficulty of putting together 
a proposal that would be attractive to South Africa and at the same time take all the Member 
States’ wish-lists of products to be excluded from the agreement into account.  Although the end   19 
result was a protectionist mandate, with 39% of South Africa’s agricultural exports excluded from 
the envisaged agreement, the task force had still managed to get the Member States to make 
certain concessions. For example, initially the combined wish-lists of the Member States had 
represented significantly more than 39% of South Africa’s agricultural exports.  
 
Negotiations 
Commission Level: During the TDCA negotiations there was a general perception among the 
DG principals that, despite their ability to monitor the performance of TFSA both before and 
during the international negotiations with South Africa, the task force had a significant amount of 
autonomy. After all, the representatives of the DG principals understood that at certain points 
they had to compromise in order to be able to reach a common Commission position (Interview, 
Commission official, DG Trade, June 2004).  
 
Given the convergence of preferences between TFSA and South Africa, the task force was able 
to use the South African arguments and demands in its negotiations with the DGs. Although it 
was representing the EU as a whole during the formal negotiating rounds with South Africa, and 
consequently could not argue the case of South Africa there, the task force then used South 
Africa’s arguments in the intra-Commission negotiations vis-à-vis its DG principals. In the words 
of one of the South African negotiators: “At every point when we made our argument, we were 
offering ammunition [to TFSA] to take back in their fight in the Commission” (Interview, South 
African government official of DTI, May 2005).  For example,  TFSA put pressure on DG 
Enterprise to ensure greater access for South African non-agricultural products to the EU 
market. Although DG Enterprise had agreed to open up the EU market for 97% of South African 
non-agricultural products in the first mandate proposal, it got pushed by TFSA during the course 
of the negotiations to accept a 99.98% liberalisation for the industrial sector. The argument used 
by the task force was that South Africa had already reluctantly accepted a limited opening of the 
EU agricultural market, and consequently the EU had to liberalise in other sectors to show its 
commitment to support South Africa (Interview, Commission official, DG Development, May 
2004). 
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Because of their similar interests, the task force would also encourage South Africa to put direct 
pressure on the DGs during the official negotiation rounds between the EU and South Africa. It 
was generally recognised that although DG Agriculture had strong protectionist preferences, its 
South African counterpart, the National Department for Agriculture, managed to convince it to 
open up the EU market more than it had initially wished (Interview, South African government 
official, DNA, June 2005). This is an important point to make as the great control being exercised 
by the DG principals over their TFSA agent, due to their presence during the negotiations with 
South Africa, to a certain extent was balanced by this direct pressure from South Africa. 
Consequently, the preferences of TFSA (and South Africa) gained greater influence in the 
negotiation process as they were pushed by both TFSA and South Africa in their interactions 
with the DGs. South Africa thus benefited from negotiating with a Commission negotiating team 
based within DG Development, as it in this case facilitated third party influence on the EU 
agenda-setting process.  
 
EU Level:  Despite the rigid  nature of the second mandate, and the control exercised by the 
Member States through the Southern Africa Working Group and the 133 Committee, the TFSA 
agent was at times able to exercise its autonomy vis-à-vis the Council. One example of how the 
task force used its autonomy to push through its own, and South Africa’s, interests in the 
Council, was by aiming for ‘balanced burden sharing’ between the Member States in the Council 
(Interview, Commission official, DG Development, Brussels, April 2004). Although the future 
agreement between the EU and South Africa was of limited economic importance to the EU, as 
South Africa accounted for only 1.9% of EU imports and 1.3% of its exports (Sudworth and Van 
Hove 1998), the Member States attached great importance to the negotiations because of the 
potential of the EU-South Africa agreement to set a precedent for future agreements between 
the EU and third parties, especially in the area of agriculture. This area was mostly affecting the 
Southern European Member States as their agricultural production, with a focus on wine and 
citrus fruits, is very similar to that of South Africa’s. However, the task force managed to maintain 
a balanced burden sharing between the Member States by ensuring that significant concessions 
were also required by the EU for products such as beef, cheese, milk, and cut flowers, which are   21 
produced in the Northern Member States  (Interview, Commission official, DG Development, 
Brussels, 26/5/04).  
 
This section demonstrates how the  assumption about agent autonomy was seen both at the 
level of the Commission and the EU as a whole. As the main agenda-setter, the TFSA agent 
managed to get its developmental preferences reflected in the first mandate in particular. This 
developmental aspect of the agreement would have been difficult to explain if not exploring the 
intra-Commission negotiations and the fact that the Commission negotiating team was based 
within DG Development. During the negotiation stage the task force was also able to exercise a 
significant amount of autonomy. In the intra-Commission negotiations, it could use the support of 
South Africa to push its preferences vis-à-vis the DGs as South Africa interacted directly with 
these principals during the official negotiating rounds between the EU and South Africa. On the 
other hand, in the Council discussions the task force took advantage  of  the absence of the 
Member States during the negotiations between the EU and South Africa, and acted strategically 
by choosing when and in what format to present the demands made by South Africa in order to 
ensure issue-linkages and a balanced burden sharing between the Member States.  
 
Conclusions 
By testing the four assumptions of delegation, conflicting preferences and information 
asymmetry, principal control mechanisms, and agent autonomy, this paper has demonstrated 
that principal-agent analysis is of great utility when explaining the EU agenda-setting process in 
the TDCA negotiations. In particular it has shown how principal-agent analysis can be used to 
explain the internal Commission negotiations, which are often overlooked in analyses of EU 
Trade negotiations.  This innovative use of principal-agent analysis highlights that the 
Commission did not act as a unitary actor in the  negotiations with South Africa, and that the 
difference in preferences between the DGs and the Commission negotiating team were reflected 
in the initial EU agenda and the final agreement with South Africa.   
 
The conceptual framework of one agent  and two principals  not only helped to theoretically 
explain the EU agenda-setting process, but also corresponded to the perceptions of both the   22 
European and South African negotiators involved in the TDCA negotiations. For example, one of 
the South African negotiators highlighted how “the Commission for its part is itself not a unified 
force, but in some departments a strong reflection of powerful vested interests. The negotiation 
team of the Commission then has the arduous task of negotiating within itself, and with its 
opposite number, the Council, and its various substructures in Brussels” (Smalberger 2000: p. 
49). Another South African negotiator described how the Commission negotiators, before they 
could initiate negotiations with South Africa, had to seek their mandate “…working through [both] 
the Commission and the Member States” (Interview, South African government official, DTI, May 
2005). The members of TFSA also expressed how they saw themselves involved in a ‘two-step 
race’ in which they had to work through both the Commission and the Council before being able 
to agree anything with South Africa (Interview, Commission official, DG Development,  May 
2004). 
 
A problem with traditional  principal-agent analysis of EU trade negotiations is its difficulty in 
accounting for the influence exercised by third parties. Nicolaïdis (1999: p. 88) recognises this 
problem, but argues that the lack of third party influence on principal-agent analyses is a result 
of researchers’ aim to offer theoretical and empirical clarity.  However, by placing the level of 
analysis at the Commission, it is, as demonstrated in this paper, possible to account for some of 
the influence by the third party. When focusing on the actual negotiating team as the agent, it 
became clear that TFSA used the arguments made by South Africa internally vis-à-vis its 
principals both in the Commission and the Council, and when exploring the ability of the DG 
principals to control the TFSA agent,  it was clear that  South Africa was able to put direct 
pressure on the DG principals, thus balancing the reduction in autonomy of the TFSA agent 
caused by the presence of its principals at the  actual negotiating rounds with South Africa. 
Consequently it can be argued that South Africa at times helped the task force to stretch its 
delegated powers, and that the principal-agent relationship did not take place in isolation from 
the third party. The case study thus demonstrates that the EU negotiating team, despite being 
restricted in its autonomy by two sets of principals, did not present South Africa with a ‘take it or 
leave it’ offer.  
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This case study has highlighted some interesting characteristics of the EU-South Africa 
negotiations. To determine whether these are specific to the TDCA negotiations or of a more 
general nature, more case studies need to be carried out. Similarly, to explore whether the 
conceptual framework of one agent and two of principals is useful beyond the case of EU-South 
Africa negotiations, it needs to be applied to other EU trade negotiations. Since 1999 when the 
TDCA was concluded, the agreement has  served as a model for other trade agreements 
between the EU and third parties, including Chile, Mexico, Mercosur, and the current Economic 
Partnership Agreements with the ACP countries. There is consequently a vast research agenda 
to be explored.     24 
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1 In this paper the ‘EU agenda-setting process’ comprises both the development of the initial agenda for 
the negotiations and the subsequent development of EU positions throughout the negotiations with South 
Africa. 
 
2 The Lomé Convention was a trade and aid agreement which regulated the relations between the EU and 
the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries between 1975 and 2000. In 2000 the Lomé 
Convention was replaced by the Cotonou Agreement, which is a new trade and aid agreement between 
the EU and 71 ACP countries (including South Africa’s qualified membership). 
 
3 Given that the agreement turned out to be classified as an Association Agreement of a ‘mixed’ nature 
including competences of both the Community and the Member States, it also had to be ratified 
domestically within the fifteen Member States. 
 
4 The requirement laid out in Art XXIV of GATT that any Free Trade Area between two or more customs 
territories should cover “substantially all trade”, has been subject to numerous interpretations. However, 
most interpretations agree that liberalisation of 90% of all trade is an acceptable amount, as long as no 
entire sector is excluded. 